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The mass marketing of foods derived from organisms modified 
through recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology (genetically 
modified, or GM foods) has put extreme pressure on the 
interpretation and implementation of the United States’ basic food 
safety law, the venerable Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FD&CA).1 In 
its classic form, the FD&CA reflects its Progressive and New Deal 
roots. It vests enormous trust in a specialized agency, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), which is presumed to have nonpareil 
expertise over food safety. The political reality of GM foods, 
however, has placed the FD&CA and its implementation by the FDA 
in severe tension with the Organic Foods Production Act2 and with 
commercial speech doctrine. 
Although proponents of rDNA-based food technology tout 
dream products such as Golden Rice,3 most commercially viable GM 
crops are aimed at modifying the characteristics of plants with respect 
to agricultural production rather than retail consumption. GM crops 
tend to fall into two categories, either herbicide resistant (as in 
Roundup Ready soybeans) or pesticidal in their own right (as in Bt-
enhanced corn). These crops raise at least five distinct concerns: 
1. These crops may be unsafe for human consumption. 
2. Herbicide resistant GM crops may confer this trait on wild 
relatives and create “weedy” strains. 
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 1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2000). 
 2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2000). 
 3. See generally Golden Rice Project Home Page, http://www.goldenrice.org (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2007) (describing Golden Rice, a genetically modified line of rice high in vitamin A). 
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3. The widespread deployment of any pesticide enables target 
organisms to acquire resistance. 
4. Pesticidal GM crops may harm nontarget organisms (as Bt 
corn has allegedly done to the monarch butterfly). 
5. Economic pressure to adopt GM technology may squeeze 
out economically marginal farmers. 
The FD&CA offers almost nothing in direct response to these 
concerns. The second, third, and fourth objections—weediness, 
resistance, and harm to nontarget organisms—trigger a host of 
statutory authorities within the jurisdiction of the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Department of Agriculture, such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),4 the Endangered 
Species Act,5 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act.6 The fifth objection, that of economic harm to individuals or 
even entire classes of business enterprises, has long been held to fall 
outside the scope of NEPA.7 
The only concern that the FD&CA can address is objection 1—
safety for human consumption. The FD&CA provides the FDA with 
three basic statutory tools for safeguarding this interest: (1) an 
outright ban, (2) targeted mandatory labeling, and (3) 
accommodation of voluntary labeling. The FD&CA provides fairly 
clear guidance on bans and on targeted mandatory labeling. 
Voluntary labeling, on the other hand, coexists very uncomfortably 
with this statute. The trouble arises in the interplay of the FD&CA 
with two other sources of law pertinent to the marketing of foods 
produced with and without rDNA technology: the Organic Foods 
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA)8 and the First Amendment’s 
commercial speech doctrine. 
It is useful to distinguish between GM technology that 
undermines the safety of all food developed with it, on one hand, and 
GM technology that would affect only a small population (as it might 
by directing the production of a protein to which unsuspecting 
consumers would be allergic). In the former case, the appropriate 
remedy under the FD&CA is an outright ban. The FDA would have 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331–4335, 4341–4347 (2000). 
 5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). 
 6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000). 
 7. See, e.g., Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776 
(1983). 
 8. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2000). 
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the authority—indeed, the responsibility—under § 402(a)(1) of the 
FD&CA to ban all adulterated food and under § 409 to ban all 
nonapproved food additives.9 The applicability of a labeling remedy 
therefore appears to be confined to the special case of a GM food 
that is generally safe for consumption by the broader public, but 
peculiarly unsafe for some segment of the population, such as 
consumers allergic to a particular food (as in the instance of nuts). 
The FD&CA thus readily accommodates two of the three basic 
statutory options open to the FDA: an outright ban and targeted 
mandatory labeling. 
Voluntary labeling, by contrast, raises severe statutory 
difficulties. Under §§ 201(n) and 403(a)(1) of the FD&CA, food is 
“misbranded” if “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.”10 
This misbranding provision serves two distinct purposes. First, the 
prohibition on misbranding reinforces the statute’s anti-adulteration 
provisions by preventing the consumption of foods (or, for that 
matter, drugs) in excess or in the wrong combination. Second, the 
misbranding provision also serves a strong consumer protection 
purpose. Misbranding thus constitutes a form of false (and therefore 
proscribable) advertising. 
For this reason, the inclusion of a claim on a label that a food is 
not produced using rDNA technology is highly problematic. The 
FDA having concluded that a particular food satisfies § 402 and that 
its rDNA-produced food additive satisfies § 409, a contrary claim that 
another food, not produced with this technology, has superior value 
or even confirms affirmative health benefits represents an arguably 
incipient violation of § 403. 
The FDA has navigated this complex statutory and 
administrative thicket in a series of policy statements spanning a 
decade. In a 1992 proceeding, Foods Derived from New Plant 
Varieties,11 the FDA declined either to ban GM foods or to require 
across-the-board labeling of foods produced using rDNA technology. 
The crux of the 1992 policy statement was that GM foods are 
presumed “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) in the sense of  
§§ 201(s) and 409 and therefore presumptively marketable. After a 
 
 9. See also § 201(s) (defining the “food additive” and “generally recognized as safe” 
(GRAS) exceptions to mandatory FDA approval). 
 10. 7 U.S.C. §§ 321(n), 343(a) (2000). 
 11. 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992). 
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federal district court upheld the 1992 policy statement,12 the FDA 
promulgated two new policies in 2001. 
The first, an order styled Premarket Notice Concerning 
Bioengineered Foods,13 retreated to some extent from the 1992 policy 
statement’s presumption of GRAS treatment and instituted in its 
place an elaborate premarket biotechnology notice (PBN) intended 
to address the wide variety of food safety concerns raised by the use 
of rDNA technology in food production. The FDA’s second policy 
statement, Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or 
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering,14 provided draft 
guidance for vendors seeking to market their food with labels such as 
“GM free” or “biotech free.” The agency stopped short of endorsing 
such a label, at least where it is not accompanied by a statement 
stating that foods so labeled are not superior to foods lacking such a 
label. 
The upshot of the FDA’s policies, developed from 1992 to 2001, 
is that (1) GM foods are presumptively marketable after completion 
of the PBN process, (2) they need not be labeled as containing 
bioengineered ingredients, and (3) non-GM foods may be labeled as 
“GM free” or “biotech free” only in connection with an 
accompanying disclaimer that such a claim implies no qualitative 
distinction relative to other foods. As a practical matter, the OFPA 
has supplied the labeling that many consumers use in order to avoid 
ingesting GM foods. The OFPA, unlike the FD&CA, is enforced by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). In 1997 the 
USDA retracted a notice of proposed rulemaking that would have 
permitted irradiated foods, foods produced using human waste as 
fertilizer, and bioengineered foods to satisfy the then-pending organic 
standard.15 The organic standard ultimately adopted in 2002 explicitly 
excluded GM foods. For this reason, labels permitted under the 
OFPA have effectively supplanted “GM free” and “biotech free” 
labels that were long coveted but never achieved under the FD&CA. 
This solution undermines the FD&CA in two ways. First, it 
creates significant statutory tension between the FD&CA and the 
OFPA. The OFPA, for its part, does not express a consumer 
 
 12. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 13. 66 Fed. Reg. 4706 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
 14. 66 Fed. Reg. 4839 (Jan. 18, 2001). 
 15. See Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic Agriculture for 
Market- and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1552–53 (2007). 
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protection agenda that is nearly as paternalistic as § 403 of the 
FD&CA. The OFPA does set a uniform organic standard, but it is 
better understood as a measure to ease the pressure of divergent 
organic standards on farmers rather than clarifying the meaning of 
organic for consumers. The term organic, in turn, does not convey any 
sense of superiority. It communicates nothing more than compliance 
with a set of production standards whose impact on the environment 
and on food safety have not been subjected to the sort of 
comprehensive premarket testing that characterizes the work of the 
Food and Drug Administration. 
Second, the presence of a labeling solution under the OFPA 
places the FD&CA, particularly the most paternalistic expression of 
the misbranding provisions of § 403, under a palpable constitutional 
threat. The FD&CA was originally enacted decades before the 
Supreme Court subjected commercial speech to the First 
Amendment. In the 2002 Supreme Court case of Thompson v. 
Western States Medical Center,16 and the 1999 D.C. Circuit case of 
Pearson v. Shalala,17 speech-related provisions of the FD&CA came 
under withering constitutional attack. At an extreme, the rise of the 
OFPA, the revival of First Amendment scrutiny in the commercial 
sphere, and the subtle but very palpable shift from the Progressive 
Era’s bureaucratic model of consumer protection to a more 
consumer- and market-oriented model may bring the misbranding 
provisions of the FD&CA under constitutional attack. 
There are good reasons to avoid this outcome. The FD&CA and 
the FDA’s implementation of it enjoy the protection of a host of legal 
doctrines. Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored,18 especially 
where the later OFPA evinces no legislative intent to supersede the 
venerable FD&CA, a bedrock of American health law. The canon 
against constitutional doubt counsels “saving” constructions of the 
FD&CA. Finally, if administrative law doctrines such as Chevron and 
Overton Park ever counseled judicial deference to expert 
administrative decisionmaking, the FDA’s management of 
bioengineered foods represents a paradigmatic case for deference. 
Fear about food is one of the most deeply seated forms of 
behavioral protection against the natural world. Any parent knows 
 
 16. 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
 17. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 18. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“This is a prototypical case 
where an adjudication of repeal by implication is not appropriate.”). 
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that children instinctively limit their diets to avoid toxins. Prohibitions 
against certain foods constitute a very significant portion of entire 
religious traditions. It is precisely here, where food comes into contact 
with notions of good and evil, that the classic regulatory state must 
take its stand. The FDA’s regulation of foods using rDNA technology 
upholds the best of the Progressive regulatory tradition and deserves 
to survive the challenge posed by the OFPA, the revived commercial 
speech doctrine, and contemporary consumer distrust of 
governmentally supervised review of science and safety. 
